The 1985 Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act: Claiming a Cultural Identity by Carver, Kathryn A.
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 4
1986
The 1985 Minnesota Indian Family Preservation
Act: Claiming a Cultural Identity
Kathryn A. Carver
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq
Law & Inequality: A Journal of Theory and Practice is published by the
University of Minnesota Libraries Publishing.
Recommended Citation
Kathryn A. Carver, The 1985 Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act: Claiming a Cultural Identity, 4 Law & Ineq. 327 (1986).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.umn.edu/lawineq/vol4/iss2/4
The 1985 Minnesota Indian Family Preservation
Act: Claiming a Cultural Identity
Kathryn A. Carver*
In 1985, the Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act
(Minn. IFPA)1 became law, ending a legislative saga which began
with the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (federal ICWA).2 The
1985 Minn. IFPA addresses the serious problem of the removal of
Indian children from their cultural heritage due to foster care
placement in white homes.3 This article will examine the Minn.
IFPA, the needs it was intended to fulfill, and the compromises
necessary to ensure its passage. Such an examination requires dis-
cussing four topics: first, the legal issues that impinge on North
American Indian4 adoption and foster care; second, the content of
the defeated 1984 Minnesota Indian Child Welfare Act (Minn.
ICWA)5 and related legislation; third, the factors that defeated the
1984 Minn. ICWA; and fourth, the 1985 Minn. IFPA and the strate-
gies used to ensure its passage.
* Kathryn A. Carver received her J.D. from the University of Minnesota in
1986.
1. Minn. Stat. §§ 257.35-.357 (Supp. 1985).
2. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
3. In findings presented during the congressional hearings on the federal act,
studies showed that nationally about 25% of all Indian children were removed from
their homes and placed in foster care, an adoptive home, or institution. 124 Cong.
Rec. 38, 102 (1978). See also David Fanshel, Far From the Reservation: The Trans-
racial Adoption of American Indian Children 340-41 (1972). Indian children in non-
Indian foster care face the same problems as those who are adopted by non-Indian
families because foster care is often as permanent. See infra note 119 and accompa-
nying text. In an acknowledgment of the on-going nature of foster care, the federal
ICWA has a section which specifically extends coverage to Indian children in foster
care before the passage of the Act, but moved to a different foster home after the
passage of the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 1916(b) (1982).
4. I have chosen to refer to the indigenous people of North America as Indian
rather than Native American because I believe it most accurately reflects the wide
practice of indigenous people in collectively naming themselves in addition to their
tribal and band names. It is also a practice reflected in social activism (American
Indian Movement (AIM)) and the work of North American Indian authors. See,
e.g., Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford Lytle, American Indians, American Justice (1983)
[hereinafter American Indians]; Vine Deloria, Jr., Custer Died for Your Sins: An
Indian Manifesto (1969).
5. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg. (1984). See infra note 76.
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I. Indian Adoption Issues
A. Adoption Policies
The 1984 Minn. ICWA, introduced in March 1984 and de-
feated in April of the same year, proposed to give Indian tribes,
through Indian courts, an expanded role in voluntary and involun-
tary child placements. The Act, detailed in section II, addressed
the growing problem of Indian children being placed in non-Indian
institutions, foster or adoptive homes, primarily due to involuntary
foster care removal but also through voluntary foster care and
eventually, adoption proceedings.6 Nationally the removal rate for
Indian children has reached alarmingly high proportions. From
1969 to 1974, national statistics showed that 25% to 35% of Indian
children were separated from their families. 7 It appears that out-
6. In discussing these topics, the following terms are used according to the
1985 Minn. IFPA definitions:
"Child placement proceeding" includes a judicial proceeding which
could result in the following:
(a) "Adoptive placement" means the permanent placement of an In-
dian child for adoption, including an action resulting in a final de-
cree of adoption.
(b) "Involuntary foster care placement" means an action removing an
Indian child from his or her parents or Indian custodian for tem-
porary placement in a foster home, institution, or the home of a
guardian. The parent or Indian custodian cannot have the child
returned upon demand, but parental rights have not been
terminated.
(c) "Preadoptive placement" means the temporary placement of an
Indian child in a foster home or institution after the termination of
parental rights, before or instead of adoptive placement.
(d) "Termination of parental rights" means an action resulting in the
termination of the parent-child relationship under Minnesota Stat-
utes, section 260.221 [Juveniles, Grounds for Termination of Pa-
rental Rights].
Minn. Stat. § 257.351(3) (Supp. 1985).
"Voluntary Foster Care Placement" means a decision in which there
has been participation by a local social service agency or private child
placing agency resulting in the temporary placement of an Indian
child away from the home of his or her parents or Indian custodian in
a foster home, institution, or the home of a guardian, and the parent
or Indian custodian may have the child returned upon demand.
Minn. Stat. § 257.351(17) (Supp. 1985).
The primary difference between the definition sections of the 1978 federal
ICWA and the 1985 Minn. IFPA is that the former makes no distinction between
voluntary and involuntary foster care and the latter does. The proposed 1984 Minn.
ICWA and the successful 1985 Minn. IFPA use the same definitions for adoptive
placement, involuntary foster care, preadoptive placement, termination of parental
rights, and voluntary foster care placement.
7. Jo Ann Kessel & Susan Robbins, The Indian Child Welfare Act: Dilemmas
and Needs, 63 Child Welfare 225, 226 (1984). In 1969, a report covering 16 states
showed that 85% of the Indian children in foster care were placed in non-Indian
homes. Id. at 227 (citing William Byler, The Destruction of American Indian Fami-
lies, in The Destruction of American Indian Families 1, 2 (Steven Unger ed. 1977)).
The figures for removal from Indian homes and placement in non-Indian settings
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of-home placement is a favored policy in Minnesota. Figures for
Minnesota during the same time period reported that one in eight
Indian children under age eighteen was in an adoptive placement,
and one in four Indian children under the age of one year was
adopted.8 These figures did not improve even with the passage of
the federal ICWA in 1978. In 1982 the United States Department
of Health and Human Services compiled a report from a national
one-day count of children in foster care placements.9 For Indian
children under the age of twenty-one, Minnesota ranked first na-
tionally in out-of-home placement although the state ranked elev-
enth nationally in the size of its population of Indian children.' 0
Despite the small population of Indian children, Minnesota has an
Indian foster care placement rate, known as a point prevalence
rate, of 345 per 10,000 Indian children." By comparison, Arizona,
which had the largest population of Indian children, had a place-
ment rate of only 10 per 10,000 Indian children.12
To put Minnesota's placement rate of 345 for Indian children
into context, Minnesota's placement rate was 177 for Black chil-
dren, 37 for white children, and 32 for Hispanic children.'3 Those
figures rank Minnesota respectively fifth, ninth, and in the top
forty percent nationally.14
B. The Unique Legal Status of North American Indians
The problem of high removal rates from Indian families is
exacerbated by the special status of Indians. In legal theory, Indian
vary from state to state, but in each instance the removal and non-matched place-
ment rates for Indian children are several times that of non-Indian children. See id.
at 226.
8. Kessel & Robbins, supra note 7, at 226.
9. As the study defined it, foster care included placement in family foster
homes, treatment group homes, and residential treatment centers. U.S. Dep't of
Health & Human Servs., Child Welfare Research Notes #7, Race and Ethnicity of
Children in State Foster Care Systems (1984).
10. Id. at 7.
11. Point prevalence rate equals the number of children in foster care of a spe-
cific racial/ethnic group on a single day divided by the total number of children less
than 21 years old of the racial or ethnic group expressed per 10,000 children, i.e., a
rate of 345 for Minnesota indicates that 345 Indian children per 10,000 Indian chil-
dren in that state are in foster care on a single day. Id. at 5-6.
12. Id. at 6. "These figures do not include the Indian children in foster care
under the supervision of the Indian Tribal Organizations or private arrangements.
Consequently, the reported state figure under counts Indian children in foster care
which may account for the low rates in some States with large numbers of Indian
children." Id. at 2.
13. Id. at 5-6.
14. Citizens League, How Does Minnesota Compare With Other States in
Terms of Ethnic Child Placements in the Child Welfare System? (June 1984) (Sum-
mary of Child Welfare Research Notes #7).
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tribes are semi-autonomous nation states.15 In practice, the rela-
tionship between areas of the federal government's authority,
states' authority, and the Indian tribes' authority is not always
clear cut.1 6 Jurisdiction in Indian law is an often confusing me-
lange of treaties, statutes, and common law. Agency regulations
and state statutes add an additional gloss. An overview of the ju-
risdictional question is helpful to place the Minnesota legislation in
context.17
As semi-autonomous nation states, the tribes held "limited ti-
tle" to their lands which was good against all but the United States
government. This rationale was based on a doctrine of discovery.
The various European nations which discovered the United States
held absolute title to the lands they discovered. The United States
government inherited that title when it acquired the land from
those European nations.18
The theory of the Indian tribal nations as separate political
15. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
16. The positions and authority of the different actors have changed over time
depending upon the philosophy and attitudes of the current federal administration.
Before the Civil War, the Department of the Interior functioned as a state depart-
ment to act as a liaison between the United States federal government and the vari-
ous tribal governments, negotiating treaties, issuing passports to non-Indians, and
regulating their flow through the Indian territories. Russel Barsh, The Red Man in
the American Wonderland, 11 Hum. Rts. J., Winter 1984, at 15, 16. As the United
States expanded, the tribes were forced to deed more and more land to the federal
government. This westward expansion corresponded with an expansion of Euro-
pean colonization of the Third World. The colonial expansion engendered a philo-
sophical shift on the part of Europeans toward Third World People of Color from
one of pure conquest to white trusteeship over other races. This European influ-
ence on the United States government and the United States's own westward ex-
pansion led to the adoption, in principle, of a similarly paternalistic attitude toward
the Indian nations in North America. See Barsh, supra, at 16. This attitude is illus-
trated by language from United States v. Kagama.
These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities
dependent on the United States. . . . Dependent for their political
rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from them
no protection. . . . From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with
them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the
duty of protection, and with it the power.
118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886).
17. The history of and conflicts over jurisdictional questions have been written
about extensively. See Vine Deloria, Jr. & Clifford Lytle, The Nations Within: The
Past and Future of American Indian Sovereignty (1984); Elizabeth Ebbott, Indians
in Minnesota 7-17 (4th ed. 1985); American Indian Policy in The Twentieth Century
(Vine Deloria, Jr. ed. 1985); American Indians, supra note 4.
18. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573-74 (1823). The effect of
this case was to strengthen the federal government's plenary power and to
marginalize state power over the Indians. The Indians' title was good against all
(including the individual state governments) except the federal government be-
cause the Indians' title was still subject to the United States power of defeasance,
[Vol. 4:327
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entities, yet under the control of the federal government, was fur-
ther developed in the two "Cherokee cases": Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia 19 in 1831 and Worcester v. Georgia 20 in 1832. In Cherokee
Nation, the court found that Indian tribes were domestic depen-
dent nations with a relationship to the federal government not un-
like that between a ward and her guardian.21 Worcester
essentially reiterates Johnson v. McIntosh 22 and Cherokee Nation
in finding that Indian Nations are distinct independent political
communities limited "only" by their inability to sell lands to, make
treaties with, or deal with anyone other than the federal
government. 23
In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, the Supreme Court further ex-
panded the concept of Congress's plenary power by holding that
Congress had the power to unilaterally abrogate the terms of an
Indian treaty. 24 The rationale was an extension of the doctrine
that Indian tribes are wards of the United States, and as guardian,
Congress could exercise unconditional plenary power over rela-
tions between the tribes and the federal government. 25 In accord-
ance with this power, Congress passed Public Law 280 in 1953
which required five states, including Minnesota, to take over civil
and criminal jurisdiction of Indian lands from the federal govern-
ment.26 Prior to this law, Minnesota state jurisdiction over Indians
always stopped at the reservation boundaries. 27 In those states not
required to assume jurisdiction and who did not voluntarily as-
sume jurisdiction, the test for state jurisdiction has remained the
i.e., the Indians held title to their own land at the sufferance of the federal
government.
19. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
20. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
21. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
22. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
23. Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 556-59 (1832). This reasoning
was reaffirmed recently in Oneida County N.Y. v. Oneida Indians, 105 S. Ct. 1245,
1251 n.3 (1985). The Court held that the Oneida Indians' claim against the state of
New York for land taken 175 years ago was still valid because the state had unlaw-
fully purchased land directly from the Indians. The Discovery Doctrine gave the In-
dians aboriginal title good against all but the sovereign-in this case the United
States government.
24. 187 U.S. 553, 566-68 (1903).
25. Id. at 567. A 1980 case, United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980),
diminished the precedential value of Lone Wolf, though it did not expressly over-
rule it.
26. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1162 (1982) & 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982)). California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
and Wisconsin were the original five states covered by Public Law 280. In 1958
Alaska was added by Pub. L. No. 85-615, § 2, 72 Stat. 545 (1958).
27. Until the passage of Public Law 280, jurisdiction over Indian country was
governed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152-1153 (1982).
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same. If some of the parties involved are Indian, if the events took
place in Indian country, or if state jurisdiction would infringe on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them, state jurisdiction is not permitted. 28
Public Law 280 was unusual because it was passed without
the consent of or even consultation with the states or the tribes.
The primary push for the law was to control crime on the reserva-
tions and to protect non-Indians living on or near the reservations.
Civil jurisdiction was added to criminal jurisdiction almost as an
afterthought.29 The law had the effect of shifting not only respon-
sibility for crime prevention on the reservations, but also the costs
of that prevention, to the states. The law failed to satisfy either
the Indian tribes or the states because Congress did not appropri-
ate any funds for the costs of policing and protecting the reserva-
tions. Moreover, the law prohibited the states from taxing Indian
lands to finance the new costs to the states.30 The law left jurisdic-
tion in an uproar. Although Minnesota had responsibility for civil
and criminal jurisdiction on the reservations,31 it did not have total
jurisdiction. 32 Public Law 280 did not confer total jurisdiction on
the states, alter the lost status of Indian lands, terminate the fed-
eral-tribal relationship, or end the sovereign immunity of the
tribes.
Despite its limitations,3 3 Public Law 280 brought those states
28. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), is the controlling case involving a con-
tract dispute between a non-Indian trader and an Indian couple for goods sold on a
Navajo reservation. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that state jurisdiction
could only be allowed if essential tribal relations were not involved and the rights
of Indians would not be jeopardized. Because state jurisdiction would infringe on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them,
the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute.
29. "Most likely, civil jurisdiction was an afterthought in a measure aimed pri-
marily at bringing law and order to the reservations, added because it comported
with the pro-assimilationist drift of federal policy, and because it was convenient
and cheap." Carole Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535, 543-44 (1975).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982).
31. Red Lake Reservation, at its own request, was not included in Public Law
280. Ebbott, supra note 17, at 13.
32. In 1976, Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976), established that the
civil jurisdiction transferred to the states did not include taxing or regulatory pow-
ers over the reservations. Minnesota had adjudicatory jurisdiction only, not full
legislative jurisdiction and therefore could not tax reservation land.
33. Public Law 280 was amended in 1968 by the Indian Civil Rights Act, Pub. L.
No. 90-284, § 403, 82 Stat. 73, 79 (1968), which prohibited further transfer of jurisdic-
tion to states without tribal agreement. The Act also provided retrocession from
state jurisdiction back to federal jurisdiction if the state agreed. In 1975, at the re-
quest of Bois Forte Reservation and with Minnesota's agreement, the federal gov-
ernment resumed criminal jurisdiction over that reservation. Ebbott, supra note
17, at 13-14.
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it covered firmly into the Indian law jurisdictional arena. Con-
flicts arose between tribes and states over the application of state
laws to Indians and tribal law to non-Indians.3 4 This was espe-
cially true in the area of family law. In a series of court decisions
the states tried to determine jurisdiction over adoption and child
custody cases on the basis of the child's domicile. 35 Such actions
could both tear families apart and lead to the separation of the In-
dian child from Indian culture.
Cases involving placement of Indian children living off-reser-
vation are under the concurrent jurisdiction of the state in which
the Indians live and the tribe to which they belong. Traditionally,
tribal courts have retained exclusive jurisdiction over domestic
matters of tribal members.36 State courts, however, have reasoned
that it would be unconstitutional to deny Indian residents of the
state access to the state courts.3 7 The Supreme Court has not al-
ways accepted this argument and has upheld exclusive tribal juris-
diction in reservation adoption cases.38
The federal ICWA was a move to re-establish tribal, rather
than state, jurisdiction over Indian child placement cases involving
34. For a discussion of state jurisdiction see Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373
(1976); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). For a discus-
sion of hunting and fishing rights see Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S.
404, 406 (1968); State v. Clark, 282 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. 1979); and State v. Gurnoe, 53
Wis. 2d 390, 192 N.W.2d 892 (1972).
35. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976), held that the tribal court had
exclusive jurisdiction over an adoption proceeding in which all parties were tribal
members and the transaction arose on the reservation. In Wakefield v. Little
Light, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975), the tribal court had placed an Indian child
off-reservation in the temporary custody of a non-Indian. Domicile of the child is
that of the parent with whom the child resides. Because the child lived with the
natural mother on the reservation at the time the decree of temporary custody was
granted, the tribal court retained jurisdiction even though the child subsequently
moved off-reservation. In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (1976),
held that under a New Mexico statute, the state had jurisdiction because the child
and the adoptive parents lived off-reservation in New Mexico. The award of the
child to the non-Indian adoptive parents, however, ran against Navajo custom,
which gives the grandparent the status of custodian of the grandchildren. The fed-
eral ICWA ended this "domicile of the child test" by giving jurisdiction to the tribes
on the basis of the child's eligibility for enrollment in the tribe. In situations such
as custody disputes, however, although the Act provides for transfer of jurisdiction
from state to tribal courts, either biological parent could refuse to allow the tribal
court jurisdiction. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1982).
36. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
37. See Bruce Davies, Implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act, 16 Clearing-
house Rev. 179, 182 (1982).
38. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390-91 (1976). The Supreme Court has
also upheld separate treatment of Indians in other areas as well. See, e.g., Morton
v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-55 (1974) (Indian hiring preferences are not in viola-
tion of executive orders forbidding racial discrimination in government
employment).
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off-reservation Indians.39 The federal ICWA authorizes the trans-
fer of certain welfare proceedings involving Indian children living
off the reservation from state to tribal jurisdiction. 40 This change
was important because the number of Indians living off the reser-
vation had increased. Also, off-reservation Indians are, as a group,
quite poor.4 1 The combination of these two factors causes Indians
to have a greater number of specific client encounters with govern-
ment or social welfare agencies than other segments of the popula-
tion.4 2 Indian children, then, risk the consequences of state
intervention. These consequences include actions by social service
agencies and state courts which lack knowledge and understanding
of Indian cultural heritage. As a result, they fail to consider the
child's cultural heritage when placing Indian children in tempo-
rary foster homes and preadoptive placements.
The federal ICWA was enacted to protect Indian children
from non-Indian placements by increasing the tribes' participation
in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the federal ICWA
only allowed transfer of jurisdiction to the tribes in cases of foster
care placement and termination of parental rights.43 Transfer
could only occur upon the petition of either parent, the Indian cus-
todian, or the Indian child's tribe.44 The federal ICWA does not
provide for automatic transfer of cases.
In addition, only in cases of involuntary proceedings does the
statute provide for specific notice to alert both the child's parent or
Indian custodian and the child's tribe of the pending proceeding
and their right to intervene.45 In a case where there has been a
voluntary consent to foster care placement or termination of pa-
39. The federal government has the power to determine the jurisdictional rela-
tionship between the states and the tribes. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553,
565-68 (1903).
40. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b) (1982).
41. See Office of State Demographer, Minnesota Planning Agency, Population
Notes, Social and Economic Characteristics of Minnesota's American Indian Popu-
lation: 1980 (1986).
42. See Ebbott, supra note 17, at 183. See also Betty Reid Mandell, Where Are
the Children 58-59 (1973).
43. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1982). Even that limited transfer of jurisdiction was
tempered by an "absence of good cause to the contrary" clause and could only take
place absent objection by either parent.
44. Id.
45. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1982). Initially, all the provisions of the federal ICWA
were to apply to voluntary as well as involuntary proceedings. This proposal was
vigorously and successfully opposed by religious groups with large foster home pro-
grams. Thus, the final draft of the federal law excluded most voluntary proceed-
ings. Davies, supra note 37, at 192. As a result, under the federal Act, voluntary
placements do not require notification to the tribal court.
[Vol. 4:327
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rental rights, there is no requirement for notice to the tribe.46
In 1984 and 1985, the Minnesota legislature strove to clarify
the jurisdictional relationship between state and tribal courts in
situations where Indian children were separated, voluntarily or in-
voluntarily, from their biological parents. The 1984 Minn. ICWA
was an attempt to re-establish tribes' traditional control over do-
mestic relations and adoption while working in conjunction with
the state and federal government agencies and service providers.
The involvement of tribal courts in Indian child placement deci-
sions would validate the Indian cultural norms of adult responsi-
bility to children through the immediate and extended family and
tribal affiliation. Such validation is an important asset in protect-
ing Indian culture from government intrusion.
II. The 1984 Minnesota Indian Child Welfare Act
A. Previous Legislation
The 1984 Minn. ICWA47 was the first piece of Minnesota state
legislation introduced to deal specifically with the placement of In-
dian children in non-Indian homes. The Minn. ICWA grew out of
concern for the shortcomings of the existing laws. When the Act
was considered, two pieces of legislation partially addressed Indian
adoption issues in Minnesota: the federal Indian Child Welfare Act
(federal ICWA)48 and the Minnesota Heritage Child Protection
Act (Minn. HCPA).49 The federal statute, passed in 1978, was
designed "[t]o establish standards for the placement of Indian chil-
dren in foster or adoptive homes, [and] to prevent the break up of
Indian families."5 0 The Minn. HCPA, which became law in 1983,
addressed similar issues in the adoption of minority children in
Minnesota by requiring consideration of the ethnic background of
a child during adoption proceedings.51 Undoubtedly, the Minn.
HCPA, like the federal ICWA, originated from a concern over tem-
porary and permanent removal of minority children from their
homes and their placement in nonminority foster or adoptive
care.
52
46. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1982).
47. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg. (1984).
48. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
49. Minn. Stat. § 259.255 (1984).
50. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, 3069.
51. "The policy of the state of Minnesota is to ensure that the best interests of
the child are met by requiring due consideration of the child's minority race or mi-
nority ethnic heritage in adoption placements." Minn. Stat. § 259.255 (1984).
52. [T]he Congress finds-
... (3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children... ;
1986]
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The federal ICWA was specifically intended to reduce the
high rate of removal of Indian children from their homes. The in-
tent of the Act was to change the criteria applied in making the
removal decisions by changing the agencies and forums involved in
making those decisions. The federal ICWA provided for exclusive
Indian tribal jurisdiction over child welfare proceedings involving
Indian children who reside or are domiciled on Indian reservations
and authorized the transfer of proceedings involving Indian chil-
dren living off the reservation, from state courts to tribal
jurisdiction.53
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are broken
up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by
nontribal public and private agencies and that an alarmingly high per-
centage of such children are placed in non-Indian foster and adoptive
homes and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over Indian
child custody proceedings through administrative and judicial bodies,
have often failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian
people and the cultural and social standards prevailing in Indian com-
munities and families.
25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)-(5) (1982).
The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation to
protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stabil-
ity and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of
minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in foster or adoptive
homes which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture, and by
providing for assistance to Indian tribes in the operation of child and
family service programs.
25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1982).
53. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a)-(b) (1982).
The Act also:
1. Establish[es] a right of intervention in state court foster care and
termination of parental rights proceedings on the part of an In-
dian child's tribe or Indian custodian. [25 U.S.C. § 1911(c).]
2. Require[s] that full faith and credit be accorded to tribal laws,
records and judicial proceedings applicable to Indian child custody
proceedings by federal and state courts. [25 U.S.C. § 1911(d).]
3. Require[s] in any involuntary proceeding in a state court when
there is actual or constructive notice that an Indian child is in-
volved that notice be provided to the parent or Indian custodian
and tribe or that notice be provided to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior when the custodian or tribe is not known. [25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(a).]
4. Provide[s] for a right to court-appointed counsel for indigent par-
ents in any child removal, placement or termination of parental
rights proceedings. [25 U.S.C. § 1912(b).]
5. Establish[es] minimum federal evidentiary standards and proce-
dures for state court proceedings involving the involuntary re-
moval of Indian children from their homes or the termination of
parental rights. [25 U.S.C. §§ 1912(c)-(f).]
6. Establish[es] federal standards governing voluntary foster care
placements, relinquishments or terminations of parental rights
and adoptive placements. [25 U.S.C. § 1913.]
7. Establish[es] placement preferences and standards governing fos-
[Vol. 4:327
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Although the federal ICWA laid important groundwork, the
Act did not go far enough because it did not sufficiently cover vol-
untary foster care, preadoptive, and adoptive placements. In cases
of voluntary consent to foster care placement or the termination of
parental rights, the Act requires only that the parental consent be
in writing and accompanied by the judge's affidavit that the conse-
quences of the consent were explained and understood.54 If the
identity or location of any of the parties is unknown, the court can
comply with the Act by sending notice to the Secretary of the Inte-
rior.55 There is no requirement of notice to tribal social service
agencies. Many times the parent or parents do not know that prior
to a final termination of parental rights, they have the right to
withdraw consent and request the return of their child.56 Once
the final decree of adoption has been entered, the parent must
prove fraud or duress to have the decree vacated. 57
Many of the Indian children removed from their homes each
year are "voluntary" placements made by the parents. These
placements occur when parents are told that unless the child is
"voluntarily" turned over to the social welfare agency for a tempo-
rary placement, the child will be permanently removed by court
proceedings. The welfare agency's rationale is that parents are
given a certain period of time to prove they are fit to care for the
child. Problems occur because the parents are unaware of their
rights and options during the temporary, voluntary placement. For
example, parents frequently do not know that they have visiting
ter care, preadoptive and adoptive placements of Indian children.
[25 U.S.C. §§ 1915-1916.]
8. Provide[s] for a system of recordkeeping on the part of states
placing Indian children, and authorize[s] access to such records by
Indian children when they reach the age of 18 years in the case of
adoptive placements for the purpose of determining tribal affilia-
tion and related rights. [25 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1917, 1951.]
9. Authorize[s] the Secretary of the Interior to award grants to In-
dian tribes and organizations for the purposes of establishing and
operating Indian child and family service programs and preparing
and implementing child welfare codes. [25 U.S.C. § 1931(a).]
10. Authorize[s] the use of Interior Department funds as nonfederal
matching shares in connection with HEW-administered Social Se-
curity Act funds, and provide[s] that the licensing or approval of
foster homes or institutions by an Indian tribe shall be deemed
the equivalent to the licensing or approval by a state for purposes
of qualifying for assistance under federally assisted programs. [25
U.S.C. § 1931(b).]
Davies, supra note 37, at 182-83 (numerical designations do not correlate to the
original).
54. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(a) (1982).
55. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1982) (refers only to involuntary proceedings).
56. See 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1982).
57. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1982).
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rights during voluntary placements. Not visiting a child in tempo-
rary placement may be viewed by welfare personnel as lack of in-
terest in the child, leading to pernianent removal.58
The Minnesota Heritage Child Protection Act did not remedy
the federal ICWA's narrow notice requirements for voluntary re-
movals and placements. The Minn. HCPA only required that the
appropriate state agencies take the child's cultural heritage into
account before deciding on a placement.59 There was no provision
for active tribal involvement in the placement decisions of Indian
children. More importantly, there was no provision for tribal input
prior to making removal decisions.
B. The Content of the Defeated 1984 Minnesota Indian
Child Welfare Act
The 1984 Minnesota Indian Child Welfare Act was proposed
to meet the shortcomings of the federal ICWA and the Minn.
HCPA. The Minn. ICWA would have extended the federal ICWA
notice provisions to voluntary foster care and preadoptive place-
ments, and clarified the enforcement powers. In addition, the
Minnesota Act would have established a role for tribal courts in
the decision making prior to the removal of a child and, when pos-
sible, ensured an Indian placement for the child. If it had passed,
as first written, the 1984 Minn. ICWA would have been an affirma-
tion of the federal ICWA60 and a statement of belief in the integ-
rity and importance of the Indian extended family and tribe.61
58. See generally Jimm Good Tracks, Native American Noninterference, Social
Work, Nov. 1973, at 30; Carl Mindell & Alan Gurwitt, The Placement of American
Indian Children-The Need for Change, in The Destruction of American Indian
Families 61-66 (Steven Unger ed. 1977).
59. Minn. Stat. § 259.255 (1984).
60. Congress has established a federal policy to protect the best interests
of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian
tribes and families by passage of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978
(25 USC § 1901 et seq.) and has also left to the states the option of
passing their own, more protective legislation in this field (25 USC
§ 1921).
H.F. 1502 § 1(6), 73d Leg. (1984).
References to § 1 of H.F. 1502 refer to the findings section of the bill as it was
first read in the House. Section 1 became the citation section after the Committee
on Judiciary removed the findings and made additional changes in the language.
All other citations to H.F. 1502 refer to the bill in its final post-committee form.
61. [T]here is no resource that is more vital to the continued existence
and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and ... the State of
Minnesota has a direct interest in cooperating with Indian tribes to
protect children who are members of or are eligible for membership in
an Indian tribe.
H.F. 1502 § 1(1), 73d Leg. (1984).
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The goals of the 1984 Minn. ICWA were well presented in the
findings of the Act, which were:
(1) that there is no resource that is more vital to the contin-
ued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children
. . .;62
(2) that an alarmingly high percentage6 3 of Indian families are
broken up by the removal of their children from them by non-
tribal public and private agencies . . . [placing them] in non-
Indian foster and adoptive homes.. .;64
(3) that the State of Minnesota must recognize the tribal rela-
tions of Indian people and the cultural and social standards
prevailing in Indian communities.
6 5
(4) that the State of Minnesota has expressed a desire to pro-
tect the ethnic heritage or background of children who are
subject to foster care or adoption.6 6
(5) that the tribes . . . are a powerful resource by which the
State of Minnesota can help to protect Indian children's ethnic
heritage or background.
6 7
(6) that the Congress has established a federal policy to pro-
tect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the
stability ... of Indian tribes and families by [passing the fed-
eral ICWA 68] and has also left to the states the option of pass-
ing their own, more protective legislation in this field .... 69
The first version of the Minn. ICWA acknowledged both the high
removal rate for Indian children and the fact that state social wel-
fare agencies, despite the language of Minn. HCPA, had not given
due consideration to Indian children's cultural heritage.7 0 With
62. Id.
63. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
64. H.F. 1502 § 1(2), 73d Leg. (1984).
65. H.F. 1502 § 1(3), 73d Leg. (1984).
66. H.F. 1502 § 1(4), 73d Leg. (1984). This language is a direct reference to
Minn. Stat. § 259.255 (1984), also known as the Minnesota Heritage Child Protection
Act (Minn. HCPA), which states that it is the policy of the state of Minnesota "to
ensure that the best interests of the child are met by requiring due consideration of
the child's minority race or minority ethnic heritage in adoption placements."
Minn. Stat. § 259.255 requires that preference, in the absence of good cause to the
contrary, shall be given "to placing the child with (a) a relative or relatives of the
child, or, if that would be detrimental to the child or a relative is not available, (b)
a family with the same racial or ethnic heritage as the child, or, if that is not feasi-
ble, (c) a family of different racial or ethnic heritage from the child which is knowl-
edgeable and appreciative of the child's racial or ethnic heritage."
67. H.F. 1502 § 1(5), 73d Leg. (1984).
68. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1982).
69. H.F. 1502 § 1(6), 73d Leg. (1984). The federal ICWA provides:
In any case where State or Federal law applicable to a child custody
proceeding under State or Federal law provides a higher standard of
protection to the rights of the parent or Indian custodian of an Indian
child than the rights provided under this title [25 U.S.C. §§ 1911 et
seq.], the State or Federal court shall apply the State or Federal
standard.
25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1982).
70. H.F. 1502 § 1(2), 73d Leg. (1984).
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this acknowledgment, Minnesota recognized Indian tribes as polit-
ical entities and recognized tribal relations and social and cultural
standards, and thereby extended its commitment to protect ethnic
heritage.71
In addition to making a stronger policy statement than the
federal Act, the Minnesota bill was a technically better piece of
legislation. Benefiting from five years of experience with the fed-
eral ICWA, the Minn. ICWA addressed the gray areas of the fed-
eral legislation by fully including voluntary and involuntary
placements and by including an expanded list of definitions. 72 The
Minn. ICWA took Indian child protection onto new ground, giving
tribal courts clear authority over Indian adoptions and establishing
minimum standards for voluntary and involuntary removal of In-
dian children from their homes. The Minnesota bill extended the
federal policy of "acknowledging and supporting the power of In-
dian tribes to develop tribal courts to take jurisdiction over the
subject matter of [this Act]." 73 This addition was especially impor-
tant because of the jealousy with which state courts have guarded
their jurisdiction. The state traditionally considered itself the ap-
propriate arbitrator of all child custody and child welfare ques-
tions.74 Even when state court judges had been aware of the
federal ICWA, some had not enforced it.75
III. Factors That Defeated the 1984 Minnesota Indian Child
Welfare Act
Two factors account for the failure of the Minn. ICWA.76
71. H.F. 1502 § 1(3), 73d Leg. (1984).
72. Which tribe can intervene on behalf of a child when that child has, or is
eligible for, membership in more than one tribe is another gray area under the fed-
eral ICWA. The language in the Minn. ICWA provided a way to address this conflict
by allowing the tribe with the most significant contacts with the child to act first. If
that tribe has not expressed an interest in the outcome of the proceedings then any
other tribe in which the child is eligible for enrollment may act. This is particularly
important when the child has parents from, or is eligible for enrollment in, sepa-
rate tribes.
73. H.F. 1502 § 2, 73d Leg. (1984).
74. It is well established that domestic relations matters are primarily the con-
cern of the states. See De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956); Labine v. Vin-
cent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
75. See Kessel & Robbins, supra note 7, at 228.
76. The Minnesota Indian Child Welfare Act was first introduced in the House
on March 6, 1984. Co-authored by Democratic Farmer Labor (DFL) Reps. Karen
Clark, Sharon Coleman, and Doug St. Onge, it met with bipartisan support and sur-
vived the Committee on Judiciary amendment and the Health and Welfare commit-
tee review. Opposition was heartfelt but minor and the bill passed the House 87 to
38 on Friday, April 13, 1984. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 2, rev. 827 (Apr. 13, 1984).
DFL Sen. Linda Berglin carried the bill to the Senate where it was amended and
passed. In six days the bill was back in the House of Representatives to be voted on
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First, some of the legislators debating the bill lacked knowledge of
the issue. The second factor was the unwillingness of some legisla-
tors to give tribal courts any more authority in child placements
than they already had.
The opponents of the Minn. ICWA frequently voiced their op-
position in terms of specific outcomes they feared and wanted to
prevent. The feared outcomes were not always likely, or even
probable, but because many of these concerns were voiced in floor
debates it was not possible to completely educate or reassure these
legislators before the vote. 77
The opponents' fears could be placed in two general catego-
ries. The first category concerned disruption of the foster care or
adoption proceeding by tribal participation and the additional
strain this would put on the biological mother. Independent Re-
publican (IR) Rep. Kathleen Blatz felt the Minn. ICWA allowed
too much tribal intervention and that it would be a burden on the
biological mother.78 She voiced concern that the tribe would have
a veto power over the mother's wishes.7 9 Although the 1984 Minn.
ICWA would have encouraged participation of the tribe in the
placement process earlier than the federal ICWA, the Minn. ICWA
did not give the tribe veto power over the biological mother's
wishes.80 IR Rep. Kenneth McDonald thought the Minn. ICWA
limited the choices of the individual by bringing in the tribe.81 In-
volvement of the tribe in the placement proceedings does not limit
the available choices. In fact, a placement within the tribe repre-
sents an additional placement option rather than a limitation of
choices. Also, the language of the Act was only a preference list,
not a mandatory list of prioritized choices.8 2
Democratic Farmer Labor (DFL) Rep. Wesley Skoglund op-
posed the bill because it allowed the child to be reclaimed from the
in its amended form. In that brief time period, the opposition had rallied and the
coalition that had backed the bill had fractured. After emotional debate, the bill
failed to pass 46 to 76. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 605 (Apr. 19, 1984).
77. Many of the most vocal opponents of the 1984 Minn. ICWA were convinced
of the necessity of the 1985 Minn. IFPA after an education and lobbying effort ex-
plained that their areas of concern had been dealt with and were not a problem.
78. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 2, rev. 617 (Apr. 13, 1984). Representative Blatz was
concerned about a situation in which the child's Indian heritage derives solely from
the father, and his Indian heritage is of a small percentage. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg.,
tape 1, rev. 648-56 (Apr. 19, 1984).
79. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 2, rev. 634 (Apr. 13, 1984).
80. Either biological parent could prevent tribal jurisdiction. H.F. 1502 § 7(2),
73d Leg. (1984).
81. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 2, rev. 733 (Apr. 13, 1984).
82. The preference language was already in the federal law, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-
(b) (1982), and applicable to the child placements covered by that law.
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placement "for any reason" until the adoption was finalized (a
minimum of ninety days) and if a child was placed for adoption
through fraud or duress, the child could be reclaimed anytime af-
ter the final adoption decree.83 Representative Skoglund felt it was
too traumatic and disruptive to the adoptive families to allow the
tribe to intervene that late. He also thought the bill was biased
against all non-Indian relatives of the child being placed and that
the child would automatically go to the Indian side of the family.84
The opportunity to withdraw consent and reclaim children
from adoptive families is already part of the Minnesota adoption
statutes8 5 and the federal ICWA.86 The 1984 Minn. ICWA would
not have increased this right. The representation that the tribe
could interfere after a final adoption decree was incorrect. Only
the parent can bring an action in fraud or duress to have an adop-
tion decree nullified-the tribes cannot.8 7 There is also no auto-
matic presumption that the Indian side of the family will get the
child instead of the non-Indian side of the family. In the history of
the federal ICWA in Minnesota, the white or non-Indian side of
the extended family had never been denied adoption of the child.88
In addition, the Minn. ICWA language went further than the fed-
eral ICWA in specifically defining "extended family" to include
relatives of either parent.8 9
The second category of concern was the competency of the
tribal courts. This issue was raised again when the 1985 Minn.
IFPA was proposed. Representative Skoglund's opposition to the
bill was motivated by his concern with the adequacy of the tribal
courts and the due process rights of the biological parents. 90 Tri-
bal courts have a long history.91 If they receive federal funds, the
83. See H.F. 1502 § 9(2), 73d Leg. (1984). This provision was tempered by
§ 12(1) which would not permit a court to grant a parent's petition if the return was
not in the best interests of the child.
84. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 560-75 (Apr. 20, 1984).
85. Minn. Stat. §§ 259.24(6a), .25(2a) (1984).
86. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1982).
87. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(d) (1982); Minn. Stat. §§ 259.24(6a), .25(2a) (1984). When
adoption proceedings are heard in state courts, the biological mother has until her
child's age of majority to raise the claim of fraud or duress and ask for the return
of her child. See also H.F. 1502 § 9(2), 73d Leg. (1984).
88. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 660-97 (Apr. 20, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Karen Clark).
89. H.F. 1502 § 3(4), 73d Leg. (1984).
90. Telephone interview with DFL Rep. Wesley Skoglund (Oct. 10, 1985).
91. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, popularly known as the Wheeler-
Howard Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-477 (1982), provided for tribes to draft constitutions
and by-laws for self-government and to establish their own judicial system. See
American Indians, supra note 4, at 116.
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courts must adhere to Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) procedures 92
and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 196893 which ensured the exten-
sion of constitutional rights, including due process, to Indians.94
Therefore, the tribal courts provide the same legal safeguards and
procedures as the state courts, and in addition, provide a more cul-
turally and ethnically appropriate forum.
By defeating the 1984 Minn. ICWA, then, the legislators did
not prevent their "fears" from transpiring because those "fears"
were already part of the existing Minnesota adoption and child
placement statutes and the federal ICWA. Furthermore, their
fears were unfounded. The underlying issue in the defeat of the
1984 Minn. ICWA was an unwillingness to allow tribes a larger
role in deciding child placements. The legislators' discomfort with
allowing tribal participation in the placement process is evident
from their comments. Their comments portrayed the proposed leg-
islation as government intervention in the private decision of an
individual,95 the group reigning over the individual,96 and always
as a direct clash between Indians and non-Indians. The legislators'
primary fear was that a non-Indian woman with no Indian heri-
tage or self-identification would find herself pregnant by a man
with only a small percentage of Indian heritage and then have to
fight the tribe in court to place the child with non-Indian adoptive
parents. 97 This situation does not cover the vast majority of adop-
tions of Indian children. Nevertheless, if this situation did arise,
the tribe would not have jurisdiction to intercede in the adoption
process because the child would probably not be eligible for enroll-
ment in a tribe.98 Even if such a child were eligible for enrollment
92. 25 U.s.c. § 1311 (1982) sets out the model code for tribal courts; 25 U.S.C.
§ 1312 (1982) authorizes the BIA to appropriate funds to finance the tribal courts.
See Ebbott, supra note 17, at 59-62, for details of BIA control of tribal governments
through regulations and funding.
93. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982).
94. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302-1303 (1982). The Act provides the equivalent of the first,
fourth, fifth, sixth, eighth, and fourteenth amendments and article one, section
nine of the Constitution. This includes the right to due process of law.
95. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 548, 565 (Apr. 19, 1984) (statements of Rep.
Kathleen Blatz and Rep. Wesley Skoglund, respectively).
96. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 775-800 (Apr. 20, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Kathleen Blatz).
97. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 775-800 (Apr. 20, 1984). To deal more effec-
tively with this concern, the 1985 Minn. IFPA changed the definition of parent to
exclude unwed fathers where paternity has not been acknowledged or established.
Minn. Stat. § 257.351(11) (Supp. 1985). This was consistent with the federal ICWA.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(9) (1982).
98. H.F. 1502 §§ 3(10), 10(4), 73d Leg. (1984). In addition, the interactions be-
tween a mother and a tribal court in an adoption proceeding are no different than
the interactions between a mother and a state court. In both cases the purpose of a
court adoption proceeding is to terminate parental custody. In both cases the
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in a tribe and the tribe expressed interest in the case, the jurisdic-
tion section of the bill would not give the tribal court jurisdiction
if either biological parent objected.9 9 In addition, both the federal
ICWA and the Minn. ICWA provide "good cause to the con-
trary"10 0 clauses for not placing the child with Indian families.
DFL Rep. Randolph Staten made an eloquent appeal for the
passage of the 1984 Minn. ICWA before the final vote. He urged his
fellow lawmakers not to take intervention fears out of context and
instead to deal with the reality of Indian children being placed in
non-Indian homes. The "possibilities" and "might happens" of one
violation of parental rights should not, he urged, overshadow the
reality of hundreds of Indian children being removed from their
heritage.lo' Although the Minn. ICWA had successfully moved
through the House and the Senate, the bill was voted down forty-
six to seventy-six' 0 2 and was ultimately defeated in a reconsidera-
tion vote fifty-nine to seventy-one.10 3 The efforts of the bill's sup-
porters were not sufficient to save it.
IV. Strategies for Passage of the 1985 Minnnesota Indian Family
Protection Act
In the aftermath of the defeat of the 1984 Minn. ICWA, advo-
cates who had lobbied for the legislation met to discuss what had
gone wrong. So smoothly had the 1984 Minn. ICWA moved
through the committees and passed in the Minnesota House of
Representatives that when the amended version of the Act, previ-
ously passed by the Senate, came up for a reconsideration vote in
the House, there were no lobbyists on the floor. 104 No significant
opposition was expected because none had been displayed at any of
the earlier points of voting in the long process from proposed legis-
lation to law. When the 1984 Minn. ICWA reached the House floor
for the final vote, Representative Skoglund, in a surprise move,
galvanized enough opposition to defeat the bill by voicing his con-
cerns about the biological mother's rights and the adequacy of tri-
bal courts.1 0 5 As a result of the failure of the 1984 Minn. ICWA,
the strategy for passing the 1985 Minn. IFPA centered on eliminat-
mother has no final say in placement. As was stated earlier, the mother has a
longer period of time in state court to bring an action for fraud or duress to have
the child returned. Minn. Stat. §§ 259.24(6a), .25(2a) (1984).
99. H.F. 1502 § 7(2), 73d Leg. (1984).
100. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982); H.F. 1502 § 10(1), 73d Leg. (1984).
101. See H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 800-67 (Apr. 20, 1984).
102. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 605 (Apr. 19, 1984).
103. H.F. 1502, 73d Leg., tape 1, rev. 997 (Apr. 20, 1984).
104. Interview with DFL Rep. Karen Clark (Oct. 16, 1985).
105. Skoglund interview, supra note 90.
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ing the adoption provisions of the bill and on identifying and ame-
liorating the political opposition to the Act.106
The goal of the 1985 Minn. IFPA, and of the 1984 proposed
ICWA, was to inform local judges and referees of the federal
ICWA and to strengthen that law. The state laws strove to make
the federal law more powerful by addressing its shortcomings. The
1984 Minn. ICWA especially strengthened those provisions of the
federal law which dealt with voluntary placements leading to
adoption.107 It was this emphasis that defeated the 1984 Minn.
ICWA. Therefore, the drafters of the 1985 bill made the strategic
decision to remove the language that dealt with adoption.
Although this meant a lost opportunity to strengthen the federal
Act, this decision did not greatly compromise the goal of the legis-
lation because the federal Act already had language, albeit not as
strong as advocates would have liked, which addressed adoption.108
Instead, the 1985 Act concentrates on strengthening the provisions
of the federal ICWA that deal with foster care. The Minn. IFPA
sections on foster care are more comprehensive than their earlier
counterparts in the federal ICWA. The new Minnesota law distin-
guishes between voluntary foster care placementsl09 and involun-
tary foster care placementslO and requires social service agencies
and private child placing agencies to provide notice to the child's
tribe in cases of any potential out-of-home placement (involuntary
foster care),"i' voluntary foster care,112 or any potential preadop-
tive or adoptive placement.113
The effect of these distinctions is to ensure tribal involve-
ment before the decision is made to place the child out of the
home. This will prevent culturally biased removals and work to-
ward keeping the Indian family together. In the case of voluntary
foster care placement, the notice provision ensures that the parent
106. Clark interview, supra note 104.
107. See H.F. 1502 § 10, 73d Leg. (1984).
108. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1982).
109. Minn. Stat. § 257.353 (Supp. 1985) sets out in detail the procedures required
of an agency for voluntary foster care placement: determination of the child's tribe;
notice to the parents, tribal agency, and Indian custodian within seven days of
placement; notice of administrative review; return of the child upon demand of the
parents; and identification and location of extended family members.
110. The Act defines involuntary foster care placement as "an action removing
an Indian child from his or her parents or Indian custodian for temporary place-
ment in a foster home, institution, or the home of a guardian. The parent or Indian
custodian cannot have the child returned upon demand, but parental rights have
not been terminated." Minn. Stat. § 257.351(3)(b) (Supp. 1985).
111. Minn. Stat. § 257.352(2) (Supp. 1985).
112. Minn. Stat. § 257.353(2) (Supp. 1985).
113. Minn. Stat. § 257.352(3) (Supp. 1985).
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understands the nature of the out-of-home placement. 114
The Minn. IFPA also provides for the immediate return of a
child in voluntary foster care placement to his or her parents.115
Where the federal law only permits the parents to withdraw con-
sent anytime prior to the final termination or adoption decree,
116
under state law the parents may secure return of their child
within twenty-four hours of their request. 1 7 This prevents loss of
custody due to bureaucracy and ensures that parents receive the
information they need to reclaim their children.
Moreover, because the 1985 IFPA regulates foster care, its ef-
fects are nearly the same as if it covered adoption. The temporary
nature or impermanence of foster care is a myth. Sometimes long-
term foster care is the permanent placement goal rather than
adoption. In fact, long-term foster care has been a much more
common goal for Minnesota children than for children nation-
wide."l8 Although foster care was originally intended, and is still
frequently thought of, as a temporary placement option, the reality
is that a substantial number of children will remain in foster care
even after it is clear the child cannot return to his or her biological
parent.119 Minority children spend a longer time in foster care
114. Notice ensures that the parents know the child is in voluntary foster care
placement and are aware of their rights to the child. It also specifies whether a pe-
tition has been filed to terminate parental rights to the child. Minn. Stat.
§ 257.353(2) (Supp. 1985).
115. Minn. Stat. § 257.353(4) (Supp. 1985) requires that a child be returned
within 24 hours of the parents' demand. This subdivision also requires the agency
to inform the parents immediately of any requirement that prevents the return of
the child, i.e., the demand (request for return) was not made in writing. Id. See
also Minn. Stat. § 257.351(4) (Supp. 1985). This allows the parents to correct any
defect.
116. 25 U.S.C. § 1913(c) (1982).
117. Minn. Stat. § 257.353(4) (Supp. 1985).
118. Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs., Substitute Care in Minnesota 1983-1984,
at 27 (Feb. 1986).
119. Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to Achieve Permanence for Children
in Foster Care, in Foster Children in the Courts 128, 139-43 (Mark Hardin ed. 1983).
In the past, as many as 75% of the children in foster care in the United States
would not be adopted or returned to their family of origin. Joseph Westermeyer,
Cross Racial Foster Home Placement Among Native American Psychiatric Pa-
tients, 69 J. Nat'l Med. A. 234 (1977) (citing Henry Maas & R.E. Engler, Children in
Need of Parents (1959)). In 1983 and 1984 nearly 25% of the children in substitute
care in Minnesota had been there three years or longer. Fourteen percent had
been in foster care for five years or longer. Minnesota Dep't of Human Servs.,
supra note 118, at 9-10.
Foster care might be used as a permanent placement option for many reasons.
Long-term foster care can provide stability for the child while still providing peri-
odic review by the agency and visits by the biological parents (if their visitation
rights have not been terminated by the court). It also might avoid a painful court
case. For children who need special services, foster care payments may be the only
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than white children.120 Because of the length of time a child
might spend in foster care, an Indian foster care placement can be
as important for an Indian child's cultural identity as an Indian
adoptive placement.
The 1985 IFPA has an early-notice provision so the tribe be-
comes involved before the process of termination of parental rights
begins.' 2l This allows all the tribal resources to be brought to bear
in a timely fashion to aid in counseling the family and in making
an appropriate foster care placement for the child. This early in-
volvement of the tribe is the most important distinction between
the federal ICWA and the 1985 Minn. IFPA. The 1985 Act also
makes the identification of extended family members the responsi-
bility of any agency considering placement of an Indian child.122 It
is important to look to the extended family members because they
are an integral part of child rearing in Indian communities. 2 3
When the tribal court and tribal social service agencies are in-
volved early, it is less likely that a child will be removed from an
Indian setting merely because one of the extended family mem-
bers, rather than a biological parent, is caring for the child.124
State court removal for "neglect" is common in situations where
way to provide those services. For further discussion of this topic, see Hardin,
supra, at 128.
120. The percentage of children of all races in substitute care for two years or
longer was 32.5%; for Black children, it was 43%; for Indian children, 36%. Minn.
Dep't of Human Servs., Children in Substitute Care by Race (Aug. 20, 1984).
121. The Act provides for early notice, and therefore, involvement of the tribe
whenever it appears that an Indian child will become involved with a social service
agency or privately licensed child placement agency. Whenever either of these
types of agencies "determines that an Indian child is in a dependent or other condi-
tion that could lead to [either] an out-of-home placement and requires the contin-
ued involvement of the agency with the child for a period in excess of 30 days," or a
preadoptive or adoptive placement, "the agency shall send notice of the condition
and of the initial steps taken to remedy it to the Indian child's tribal social service
agency within seven days of the determination." Minn. Stat. § 257.352(2)-(3) (Supp.
1985).
When an Indian child is voluntarily placed in foster care, the local so-
cial service agency involved in the decision to place the child shall give
notice of the placement to the child's parents, tribal social service
agency, and the Indian custodian within seven days of placement....
If a private licensed child placing agency makes a temporary voluntary
foster care placement pending a decision on adoption by a parent, no-
tice of the placement shall be given . . . upon the filing of a petition
for termination of parental rights or three months following the tem-
porary placement, whichever occurs first.
Id. at § 257.353(2).
122. Minn. Stat. § 257.353(5) (Supp. 1985).
123. Henry Green, Risks and Attitudes Associated with Extra-Cultural Place-
ment of American Indian Children: A Critical Review, 22 J. Am. Acad. Child Psy-
chiatry 63, 66 (1983).
124. See Ebbott, supra note 17, at 171-72, 178-82.
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child care is provided by a member of the extended family. This
diffusion of parental authority to extended family members is seen
as a lack of responsibility on the part of nuclear family mem-
bers.125 State courts use a nuclear family model which is a Euro-
American concept. Indian courts look at the tribe and the ex-
tended kinship networks. The "nuclear family" is not an Indian
cultural concept. 126 State courts also sometimes overlook the im-
portance of cultural, spiritual, and heritage support available in In-
dian communities in favor of material resources available in a non-
Indian family.12 7 Courts have also been bound by outmoded stan-
dards which have eliminated Indian homes for placement.128
Although the new tribal courts have taken on some of the proce-
dures of the Anglo-American system, they have also maintained
their own distinctive approach.129 The emphasis is on mediation
and the resolution of the conflict at hand.130 The tribal judge at-
tempts to reach a resolution that will benefit the entire Indian
community because the community or tribe is seen as a large ex-
tended family unit.131
In addition to a change in emphasis, other political strategies
were pursued to ensure passage of the 1985 Minn. IFPA. The pub-
lic leadership of the 1985 effort was much less politically partisan.
IR House majority leader Connie Levi was named as a co-author of
the Act. DFL Rep. Karen Clark gave away authorship of the bill
125. As one social worker in a reservation town stated: "I understand the ex-
tended family relationship; I just don't accept it." Westermeyer, supra note 119, at
236 (quoting Edwin McDowell, The Indian Adoption Problem, Wall St. J., July 12,
1974, at 6, col. 3).
126. Green, supra note 123, at 66.
127. Id. at 63.
128. Some Indian homes have been rejected as placements because of minimum
space rules, i.e., state laws which require a certain number of square feet per child
in a foster home. These minimum space rules were adopted in the pre-antibiotic
era when certain illness rates were related to crowding. Such rules place physical
requirements before social and psychological characteristics. Westermeyer, supra
note 119, at 236.
An additional concern has been raised by some Indian community workers
about the way foster parent eligibility is determined. (At their request, these com-
munity workers will remain anonymous.) "Rule One," Minn. R. 9545.0010-.0260
(1985), which sets out criteria for foster care parents, has not been revised since
1974. Its regulations against allowing anyone with a criminal record to be a foster
parent has eliminated some applicants on the basis of their past activities in AIM
and the civil rights movement. Yet these are also some of the applicants with the
strongest and most positive Indian self-image. In some instances the applicant's ju-
venile record has been resurrected and examined.
129. American Indians, supra note 4, at 118. Bureau of Indian Affairs guidelines
lay out the requirements that must be fulfilled in order for a tribe to receive fed-
eral financial support for their court. See supra note 92.
130. American Indians, supra note 4, at 120.
131. Id.
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to IR Rep. Steve Sviggum. These actions made the Independent
Republican support for the bill more visible.13 2 The new, broader-
based support for the bill made it easier to pass.
In their final effort, the proponents sought to meet the objec-
tions of those who had opposed the law in 1984. This meant ad-
dressing those concerns for race-blind adoptions voiced by
Representative Skoglund and his supporters, most notably those
adoption agencies which specialize in overseas, interracial adop-
tions. Some adoption agencies felt threatened by the adoption pro-
visions because there was concern that limiting the interracial
adoption of Indian children would open the door to similar restric-
tions on other racial or ethnic groups. Open-adoption policy advo-
cates felt this was a return to the "segregationist" policies of the
1950's.133 This approach to Indian adoption ignores North Ameri-
can Indians' unique legal status in the United States and persists
in viewing Indians as a racial classification rather than as a polit-
ical and legal entity. Separate treatment of Indians is not an equal
protection violation because it is not based on race, but on political
status.13 4 Therefore, Indian adoption policy cannot set a precedent
for other racial minority children.
Supporters of the Act ascertained the position of adoption
agencies early in the push for the 1985 Act, and used a combina-
tion of confrontation, compromise, education, and emotional public
testimony to counter much of the adoption agency opposition to
the law.135 This process took several forms depending on the activ-
ity. The confrontation entailed just that-asking adoption agencies
and advocates directly to determine where they stood on the Act
and to educate them about the issues involved in Indian adoption
so that the agencies would support the Act. Certainly the com-
promises changing the language and focus from adoption to foster
care went a long way in accomplishing that goal.
Nevertheless, the most important and effective tools for edu-
cating the public about the 1984 Minn. ICWA and for gaining the
adoption agencies' support for the 1985 Minn. IFPA were the In-
dian speakouts at many of the subcommittee hearings and meet-
ings.x36 In the speakouts, Indian adults recounted what growing up
132. IR Rep. Steve Sviggum was listed as the chief author of the bill. Co-authors
were IR Reps. Ben Boo, Maurice Zaffke, House Majority Leader Connie Levi, and
DFL Rep. Karen Clark.
133. Telephone interview with DFL Rep. Wesley Skoglund (Oct. 18, 1985).
134. See Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 390 (1976); Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974).




in a non-Indian, white adoptive home had done to them and their
sense of self. For many it was a devastating experience to try to
come to terms with their Indian status. Indian adults raised in
non-Indian homes reported a profound sense of isolation coupled
with a complete lack of Indian identity. These feelings are often
labeled the "Apple Syndrome,"'137 where during adolescence, In-
dian children raised in white homes as white, come to a sense of
their ethnic and racial differences from their adoptive parents.
Without any knowledge of their own cultural history and identity,
these Indian children feel they have nowhere to belong. As adults
they are left knowing they are not white, but do not quite feel
they are Indian because they lack any knowledge of the ceremo-
nies, customs, and religion that make up their cultural identity.
These Indian children are raised without the sense of tribal affilia-
tion which is an integral part of Indian self-knowledge and
identity.
A. Content of the 1985 Minn. IFPA
Placing the defeated 1984 Minn. ICWA and the successful
1985 Minn. IFPA side by side, two major differences become clear.
The first difference between the laws is language. The 1985 Minn.
IFPA eliminated all language that was already in the federal
ICWA. The findings section, 138 which had the most political and
emotional impact because it talked about the importance of the In-
dian child being raised with a sense of Indian welfare and identity,
was not reintroduced. The 1985 Act also eliminated any declara-
tion of policy,139 especially any acknowledgment that the state law
would extend the federal policy provisions of the ICWA. In es-
sence, the language that was most controversial in the 1984 version
was removed from the 1985 Act. This included the sections on ju-
risdiction, intervention, and full faith and credit, 140 state recogni-
tion of tribal courts,141 and much of the procedural explanations.
Rather than replicating portions of the federal ICWA in the state
law as the 1984 version would have, the 1985 Minn. IFPA is a com-
137. "'Apple' refers to racially Indian people with ethnic preferences of the ma-
jority society, i.e., 'Red' or Indian on the outside and 'White' on the inside." Joseph
Westermeyer, The Apple Syndrome in Minnesota: A Compilation of Racial-Ethnic
Discontinuity, 10 J. Operational Psychiatry 134, 134 (1979).
138. H.F. 1502 § 1, 73d Leg. (1984). The findings section had been deleted from
the Minn. ICWA by the Committee on Judiciary.
139. H.F. 1502 § 2, 73d Leg. (1984).
140. H.F. 1502 § 7, 73d Leg. (1984). The 1985 Act replaced these with a short sub-
division giving Indian tribes jurisdiction and providing for transfer of proceedings
in child placement proceedings. Minn. Stat. § 257.354 (Supp. 1985).
141. H.F. 1502 § 6, 73d Leg. (1984).
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plementary law. The changes in language did not weaken the Act
because the omitted language is all included in the federal act.1
42
The changes therefore do not harm the purpose of the Act.
The second major difference between the 1984 Minn. ICWA
and the 1985 Minn. IFPA is in scope. The proposed 1984 law would
have extended the scope of early tribal notice and therefore in-
volvement in Indian child placements to include voluntary adop-
tion. In the successful 1985 version of the Act, the law
concentrates on the involuntary foster care placement process
rather than adoption, although voluntary foster care is covered.
The reason for both changes, in language and in scope, between
the 1984 bill and the 1985 Act is the same: politics. Although these
changes were sufficient to allow the Act to pass into law in 1985,
they were not enough to totally eliminate opposition.
B. Opposition to the 1985 Minn. IFPA
Opposition to the 1985 Minn. IFPA focused on two concerns:
whether tribal courts could adequately protect participants' proce-
dural rights and whether transracial adoptions would be permit-
ted. The first concern was based on due process. Were tribal courts
as competent and procedurally fair as state courts? Was there a
right of appeal in the tribal courts? Opponents felt that if there
was no right of appeal, then it was not fair that of all the ethnic or
minority groups in the United States, only North American Indi-
ans were denied a right of appeal. 143
Under the Minn. IFPA, "tribal court" is defined as "a court
with jurisdiction over child custody proceedings which is either a
court of Indian offenses, or a court established and operated under
the code or custom of an Indian tribe, or the administrative body
of a tribe which is vested with authority over child custody pro-
ceedings."144 As stated earlier, tribal courts which are supported
by federal funds must follow BIA guidelines and procedures. The
tribal court system provides for an appeal process. From the tribal
courts, the case is appealed to the tribal court of appeals. From
there an appeal would move to the federal district courts. Once in
142. The 1985 Minn. IFPA also dropped certain definitions previously included
in H.F. 1502 § 3, 73d Leg. (1984), which were unnecessary because the scope of the
1985 Act was narrower. The 1985 Act also eliminated H.F. 1502 § 14 (improper re-
moval of a child from custody) and § 15 (emergency removal of the child). These
changes were made in response to the defeat of the 1984 law. The changes stream-
lined the state law and therefore made it more palatable to its opponents. The
changes did not sacrifice any protection of the Indian families, however, because
the language omitted from the state law was already in the federal ICWA.
143. See Skoglund interview, supra note 90 and accompanying text.
144. Minn. Stat. § 257.351(15) (Supp. 1985).
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the federal court system, the case would follow the regular appeal
route through the United States courts of appeal to the United
States Supreme Court.145 In addition, the Indian Civil Rights Act
of 1968 also ensures the extension of certain constitutional rights
to Indians.146
Under the Minn. IFPA, the tribal court has exclusive juris-
diction over a child placement proceeding involving an Indian
child who resides within the tribe's reservation at the commence-
ment of the custody proceedings.147 If the child is in legal custody
elsewhere pursuant to an order of a tribal court, the Indian tribe
retains exclusive jurisdiction.148 If the child does not live on the
reservation and is therefore not already subject to tribal court ju-
risdiction, the state court must transfer jurisdiction to the tribal
court. Opponents found the required transfer to be too oppressive
because it would "force" the family into a tribal court. The trans-
fer will only occur, however, "absent objection by either parent,"
and absent "good cause to the contrary," so either parent could
prevent the transfer of jurisdiction.149
The second area of opposition to the Minn. IFPA centers on
the premise that transracial adoption is beneficial and often neces-
sary to prevent children being raised in institutional facilities due
to a lack of minority adoptive parents. The Minn. IFPA does not
prohibit transracial adoption. The Act merely provides for partici-
pation by Indian tribes in the placement of their children. The
Minn. IFPA does not even list a placement order of preference.150
In addition, opponents argued that a return to the "matching" the-
ory approach to adoption would be racist and detrimental to the
child's best interests because this would often mean eliminating a
potential adoptive family in a higher income bracket because of its
race. This argument underlines what was already happening in so-
cial service agencies and state courts. The non-Indian social ser-
vice providers' values placed material resources above the
importance of Indian cultural, spiritual, and community support
for the Indian child. Besides the paternalistic attitude toward In-
145. See American Indians, supra note 4, at 112, for a diagram of the right to
appeal.
146. Among others, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 imposed such basic re-
quirements as free speech, free exercise of religion, due process and equal protec-
tion. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1982).
147. Minn. Stat. § 257.354(1) (Supp. 1985).
148. Id.
149. Id. at § 257.354(3).
150. The placement order of preference is in the federal Indian Child Welfare
Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(c) (1982), and in Minn. Stat. § 259.255 (1984) (Protection of
Heritage or Background).
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dian adoptive and foster care families, this argument also flies in
the face of the "Apple Syndrome" studies151 and the personal tes-
timony of the Indians who "spoke-out" about the effects of non-In-
ian adoption on their lives.152
VI. Conclusion
The 1978 federal ICWA was passed "[t]o establish standards
for the placement of Indian children in foster or adoptive homes,
[and] to prevent the break up of Indian families."l53 While the fed-
eral Act accomplished many of its goals, the law was insufficient to
completely solve the problem of Indian child placement in non-In-
dian homes. This was in part because the Act did not sufficiently
address voluntary foster care, preadoptive, and adoptive place-
ments.' 54 In 1983 the state of Minnesota passed the Heritage Child
Protection Act which required consideration of the child's ethnic
background during the decision-making process of adoption pro-
ceedings.155 This law, however, was written for racial minorities
and the placement of minority children in white homes. The law
makes no provision for Indian tribal participation in placement de-
cisions. Because Indians are a separate political entity with their
own governments, lands, and cultural and spiritual existence,
which pre-date the United States and continue to this day, their
situation is different from that of other racial groups. The Minn.
HCPA did not address this difference.
The 1984 Minnesota Indian Child Welfare Act would have
remedied these shortcomings. Nevertheless, the 1984 Act failed to
pass the Minnesota legislature for two reasons. First, general adop-
tion law was not well-known by a number of opponents. This situ-
ation allowed unlikely or inaccurate scenarios to dominate the
final discussions of the bill. Second, a number of legislators were
hesitant to give Indian courts more power. This last concern re-
flected a fear of increased government intervention in the family
(in the form of tribal courts) and a dilution of state court authority
over adoption. Legislators were concerned with tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians. Supporters had not anticipated such responses
because they had not been raised earlier in the discussion of the
bill.
The 1985 Minnesota Indian Family Preservation Act suc-
151. See Westermeyer, supra note 137.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 136-137.
153. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069, 3069.
154. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
155. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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ceeded using a combination of general education about adoption
law, specific education on the effects on Indians of non-Indian
placement, and a redrafting of the bill's language to emphasize
early tribal notification and the foster care process. The more vola-
tile emphasis on adoption was skirted. The Minn. IFPA dealt with
foster care, but not adoption, as a political expedient to allow pas-
sage of the bill. Because foster care can be as permanent as adop-
tion, indeed some foster parents adopt their foster children,156 the
Minn. IFPA still makes an important contribution toward the
preservation of Indian cultural heritage. Although the Minn. IFPA
will not eliminate the problem of out-of-home placement of Indian
children in non-Indian homes, the Act has brought the problem to
the attention of the state legislature and sensitized the state gov-
ernment and service agencies to the issues involved. The 1985 Act
is a substantial first step toward addressing the shortcomings of
the federal ICWA and will be an important tool for protecting the
integrity of Indian cultural identity.
156. For a discussion of the rights of foster parents to adopt their foster children,
see Mark Hardin & Josephine Bulkley, The Rights of Foster Parents to Challenge
Removal and to Seek Adoption of Their Foster Children, in Foster Children in the
Courts 299 (Mark Hardin ed. 1983).
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